What is our nature? : What does government do for us, and to us? -- Cooperation : lepers & pirates -- Punishment : Drop City & the utopian communes -- Justice : 1850's San Francisco & the California gold rush -- Injustice : the Attica uprising & the Batavia shipwreck -- Survival : the Inuits of King William Land & the mutineers on Pitcairn Island -- Subversion : hellships & prison camps -- Credibility : America's prohibition -- Excess : committing (...) felony murder while asleep in bed & life in prison for an air-conditioning fraud -- Failure : getting away with murder beyond a reasonable doubt -- Collapse : Escobar's Colombia -- Taking justice seriously five proposals -- Epilogue : what are they doing now? (shrink)

What are we doing to our climate? Emissions from fossil fuel burning have raised carbon dioxide concentrations 35 percent higher than in the past millions of years. This increase is warming our planet via the greenhouse effect. What is climate change doing to and for us? Dry regions are drier and wet ones wetter. Wildfires have increased threefold, hurricanes more violent, floods setting record heights, glaciers melting, and seas rising. Parts of Earth are increasingly uninhabitable. Climate change requires us to (...) act as a global community. Climate justice enjoins emitters to pay the social‐environmental costs of fossil fuel burning. This would expedite green solar, wind, and next‐generation nuclear energy sources. Individuals should conserve resources, waste less food, and eat a plant‐rich diet. (shrink)

This is a collection of papers that helped shape the field of formal semantics in linguistics.

The case outlined below is the basis for the In That Case section of the “Ethics and Epistemology of Big Data” symposium. Jordan receives reports from two separate personal genomic tests that provide intriguing data about ancestry and worrying but ambiguous data about the potential risk of developing Alzheimer’s disease. What began as a personal curiosity about genetic inheritance turns into an alarming situation of medical uncertainty. Questions about Jordan’s family tree are overshadowed by even more questions about Alzheimer’s disease (...) and healthy ageing. As a parent, Jordan is unsure whether to share these results and what it would mean for their children to learn about their genetic inheritance and potential future health. Furthermore, Jordan is unsure how to make sense of these reports in light of current knowledge of the risk factors for Alzheimer’s disease and in the absence of effective treatments or robust preventative guidelines. (shrink)

Paul H Hirst; Human Movement, Knowledge and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 13, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 101–108, https://doi.org/10.11.

Degeneracy is a poorly understood process, essential to natural selection. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the concept of degeneracy was commandeered by the colonial imagination. A rigid understanding of species, race, and culture grew to dominate the normative thinking that persisted well into the burgeoning new industrial age. A 20th-century reconfiguration of the concept by George Gamow highlighted a form of intraorganismic variation that is still underexplored. Degeneracy exists in a population of variants where structurally different components perform a (...) similar, but not necessarily identical, function with respect to context. The presence of degeneracy increases a system’s complexity and robustness against perturbations. The loss of a genetic component in biological systems, for example, can be compensated by redundant elements , or by degenerate elements . A historical survey of the use of the term “degeneracy” reveals how and why the processes it once designated, and the mechanisms it now represents, have largely escaped the purview of contemporary science. Despite confusion and general oversight, degeneracy has been characterized by select researchers at the molecular, genetic, and neuronal levels. The concept is a potent analytical tool to understand selection, variation, and transmission. (shrink)

Paul H Hirst; Forms of Knowledge—A reply to Elizabeth Hindess, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 7, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 260–271, https://doi.or.

Paul H Hirst; The Nature of Educational Theory:, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 6, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 110–118, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14.

It has long been held that humans need government to impose social order on a chaotic, dangerous world. How, then, did early humans survive on the Serengeti Plain, surrounded by faster, stronger, and bigger predators in a harsh and forbidding environment? Pirates, Prisoners, and Lepers examines an array of natural experiments and accidents of human history to explore the fundamental nature of how human beings act when beyond the scope of the law. Pirates of the 1700s, the leper colony on (...) Molokai Island, prisoners of the Nazis, hippie communes of the 1970s, shipwreck and plane crash survivors, and many more diverse groups--all existed in the absence of formal rules, punishments, and hierarchies. Paul and Sarah Robinson draw on these real-life stories to suggest that humans are predisposed to be cooperative within limits. What these "communities" did and how they managed have dramatic implications for shaping our modern institutions. Should today's criminal justice system build on people's shared intuitions about justice? Or are we better off acknowledging this aspect of human nature but using law to temper it? Knowing the true nature of our human character and our innate ideas about justice offers a roadmap to a better society. (shrink)

A defining characteristic of primary emotions is that they occur in wide variety of species. Secondary emotions are thought to be restricted to humans and other primates. We report evidence from two studies investigating claims of primary and secondary emotions in non-primate species. Study 1. We surveyed 907 owners about emotions that they had observed in their animal. Participants reported primary emotions more frequently than secondary emotions and self-conscious emotions more frequently than self-conscious evaluative emotions. Jealousy was reported at very (...) high levels (81% of dogs and 79% of horses), which was surprising as jealousy is generally defined as a secondary emotion. Study 2. Forty dog owners were interviewed about the contexts and behaviours that led them to claim their animal was jealous. There was coherence and consistency in the behavioural descriptions of jealousy. We claim that such reports provide evidence for the existence of secondary emotions in non-primate species as predicted by theorists such as Buck (Citation1999). (shrink)

There are many cases of conduct for which responsibility can plausibly be ascribed to a group, in addition to any responsibility ascribable to the group's constituent members. It is important to be able to make such ascriptions because without them we are unable to assign responsibilities for many sorts of humanly-caused harms for which responsibility cannot reasonably be ascribed to individuals alone. Two recent theories of collective responsibility advance our understanding of why it is important to be able to hold (...) groups accountable, but they apply only to a limited spectrum of groups, and rely on the plausibility of importing unnecessary individualistic assumptions into discussions of collective responsibility. ;I argue that we can justify ascription of collective responsibility without engaging in difficult metaphysical or ontological disputes. In particular, in order legitimately to ascribe collective responsibility we need not demonstrate that groups are capable of exhibiting intentions, or that groups can be considered 'moral persons'. We may reasonably consider organized groups to take action, and we may justly blame or praise them, when their members engage in what I call 'joint purposive behavior', as when an automobile manufacturer knowingly markets faulty vehicles. I argue, further, that certain unorganized groups, or 'random collectivities', can justly be blamed for promoting values and attitudes conducive to harmful behavior, as when a hate group advocates violent actions against minorities, or praised as groups for promoting values that encourage laudable behavior. ;I argue that most objections to collective responsibility rely on various misunderstandings of what it means for a group to be collectively responsible, notably, the belief that if a group is responsible its members cannot also be individually responsible, and the belief that collective responsibility 'distributes' among the individuals in the responsible group. In addition, I argue that large-scale environmental problems such as global warming lend themselves to a collectivist analysis, and that a view of collective responsibility that balances the harm-prevention and fault-finding purposes of responsibility ascription may help us to resolve such problems. (shrink)

Zygon®, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 1039-1044, December 2021.

Having a criminal justice system that imposes sanctions no doubt does deter criminal conduct. But available social science research suggests that manipulating criminal law rules within that system to achieve heightened deterrence effects generally will be ineffective. Potential offenders often do not know of the legal rules. Even if they do, they frequently are unable to bring this knowledge to bear in guiding their conduct, due to a variety of situational, social, or chemical factors. Even if they can, a rational (...) analysis commonly puts the perceived benefits of crime greater than its perceived costs, due to a variety of criminal justice realities such as low punishment rates. These conclusions are reinforced by studies of crime rates following rule changes. Many show no change in deterrent effect. Those that purport to show a deterrent effect commonly have persuasive non-deterrence explanations, such as a change in incapacitative effect. The few studies that segregate deterrent and incapacitative effects tend to reinforce the conclusion that rule formulation has a deterrent effect only in those unusual situations in which the preconditions to deterrence exist. Even there, the deterrent effects are quite minor and unpredictable, hence inadequate grounds to influence criminal law rule making. (shrink)

Introduction Origin of this book The most beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious. It is the source of all true art and science. ...

The availability of diverse sources of data related to health and illness from various types of modern communication technology presents the possibility of augmenting medical knowledge, clinical care, and the patient experience. New forms of data collection and analysis will undoubtedly transform epidemiology, public health, and clinical practice, but what ethical considerations come in to play? With a view to analysing the ethical and regulatory dimensions of burgeoning forms of biomedical big data, Brent Daniel Mittelstadt and Luciano Floridi have brought (...) together thirty scholars in an edited volume that forms part of Springer’s Law, Governance and Technology book series in a collection titled The Ethics of Biomedical Big Data. With eighteen chapters partitioned into six carefully devised sections, this volume engages with core theoretical, ethical, and regulatory challenges posed by biomedical big data. (shrink)

To find more information on Rowman & Littlefield titles, please visit us at www.rowmanlittlefield.com.

Representationalism (aka intentionalism) has been the most significant weapon in the late twentieth century defence of direct realism. However, although the representationalist objection to the Phenomenal Principle might provide an effective response to the arguments from illusion and hallucination, plausible representationalist theories of perception are, when fleshed-out, incompatible with metaphysical direct realism’s directness-claim. Indeed within cognitive science, direct perception is the avowedly-radical anti-representationalist heterodoxy. Drawing on both the philosophy and cognitive science, we develop a robust argument against representationalist direct realism (...) which does not rest on illusory cases or the notion of an object of immediate awareness. None of the representations so far posited, or in prospect, can supply the content required of a representation in a direct realist theory of veridical perception. (shrink)

Conventionality and aptness are two dimensions of metaphorical sentences thought to play an important role in determining how quick and easy it is to process a metaphor. Conventionality reflects the familiarity of a metaphor whereas aptness reflects the degree to which a metaphor vehicle captures important features of a metaphor topic. In recent years it has become clear that operationalizing these two constructs is not as simple as asking naïve raters for subjective judgments. It has been found that ratings of (...) aptness and conventionality are highly correlated, which has led some researchers to pursue alternative methods for measuring the constructs. Here, in four experiments, we explore the underlying reasons for the high correlation in ratings of aptness and conventionality, and question the construct validity of various methods for measuring the two dimensions. We find that manipulating the processing fluency of a metaphorical sentence by means of familiarization to similar senses of the metaphor (“in vivo conventionalization”) influences ratings of the sentence's aptness. This misattribution may help explain why subjective ratings of aptness and conventionality are highly correlated. In addition, we find other reasons to question the construct validity of conventionality and aptness measures: for instance, we find that conventionality is context dependent and thus not attributable to a metaphor vehicle alone, and we find that ratings of aptness take more into account than they should. (shrink)

The thymus gland, which plays a key role in the maturation and functioning of the lymphoid system, is implicated in the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). The observation that the thymic hormone, thymosin α1, is elevated in individuals at risk for AIDS (as opposed to being depressed in other immunodeficient states) has provided the first direct evidence that the thymus is malfunctioning early in the course of this deadly disease. These observations have been valuable in screening for the syndrome with (...) a rapid radioimmunoassay and in the initiation of the first clinical trials with thymosin in high risk homosexuals and hemophiliacs. If the progressive immune paralysis in AIDS is due to a dying thymus, the early identification of asymptomatic carriers of AIDS or individuals with modest AIDS‐related dysfunction may lead to therapy with thymosin or other thymomimetic agents that can restore immune function and prevent the onset of frank AIDS. (shrink)

There is at this point no shortage of testimonials regarding the practice of philosophy for children. In addition, there have been a number of studies which give further support to the claim that philosophy for children is a valuable classroom practice. The idea that pre-college instruction in philosophy is beneficial is no longer in doubt, nor is there a significant lack of materials for use in philosophy for children programs. From Lewis Carroll to Matthew Lipman authors constructed texts that go (...) far in engaging children's philosophical inclinations. If there is any weakness in the practice of philosophy for children it is usually found in the individual classroom. (shrink)

The paper criticizes criminal law scholarship for helping to construct and failing to expose analytic structures that falsely claim a higher level of rationality and coherence than current criminal law theory deserves. It offers illustrations of three such illusions of rationality. First, it is common in criminal law discourse for scholars and judges to cite any of the standard litany of "the purposes of punishment" -- just deserts, deterrence, incapacitation of the dangerous, rehabilitation, and sometimes other purposes -- as a (...) justification for one or another liability rule or sentencing practice. The cited "purpose" gives the rules an aura of rationality, but one that is, in large part, illusory. Without a principle defining the interrelation of the "purposes," nearly any rule can be justified by some "purpose of punishment." Thus, a decision maker can switch among distributive principles as needed to provide an apparent rationale for whichever rule the person prefers, even if that preference is not based on rational criteria. A second example is found in a central mechanism for determining an offenderâs blameworthiness: the use of an individualized objective standard. The widely used mechanism avoids the problems acknowledged to attend a strictly objective standard. A person's situation and capacities are central to an assessment of whether a person can be fairly blamed for a violation, and the individualized objective standard allows the decision maker to take these into account. At the same time, the mechanism avoids reversion to a completely subjective standard, which might exempt many blameworthy cases from liability. In reality, however, the mechanism only shifts the form of the problem. Codes that use the individualized objective standard fail to provide a principle by which one can determine those characteristics of an offender with which the objective standard ought to be individualized and those with which it ought not. Without a governing principle, the issue again is left to the discretion of decision makers, with no guidance as to how that discretion is to be exercised. A final illusion obscures whether the criminal justice system is, in fact, in the business of "doing justice." The "criminal justice" system imposes "punishment" and encourages moral condemnation of those found "guilty" of "crimes." But while the system cultivates its doing-justice image, it increasingly shifts to a system of essentially preventive detention, where a violator's sanction is derived more from what is needed to incapacitate him from committing future offenses than to punish him for a past offense. There are great advantages to the deception, but also serious costs and inefficiencies. The paper discusses why some illusions are more objectionable than others and what the existence of such illusions says about modern criminal law scholarship. (shrink)

Because they track the Model Penal Code, current criminal law formulations of risk offenses typically fail to distinguish the rule of conduct question—What risks does the criminal law prohibit?—from the adjudication question — When is a particular violator’s conscious disregard of, or his inattentiveness to, a risk in a particular situation sufficiently condemnable to deserve criminal liability? Instead, the formulations address only the second question — through their definition of reckless and negligent culpability — and fail to provide a rule (...) of conduct provision to define a prohibited risk. This reliance upon culpability definitions as the core of risk-creation offense definitions is problematic because it fails to announce a useable conduct rule that describes those risks the law prohibits. Instead, this approach subjectivizes the definition of prohibited risks. What may be held "reckless" or "negligent" for one person may not be "reckless" or "negligent" for another person in the identical situation — an effect that strips case adjudications of their value in educating the community as to risks that the rules of conduct prohibit. Current risk-creation offenses also are problematic because they make results — including the creation of a prohibited risk — irrelevant to criminal liability. While this is consistent with the Model Code’s view that resulting harm is insignificant, that only culpable state of mind ought to affect liability, it is inconsistent with the view of most state code drafters. Thus, while the Model Code grades offenses without regard to whether a prohibited risk in fact is created, most state codes logically would want to grade lower in the absence of a prohibited risk. These two fundamental problems—the failure to distinguish conduct rules and adjudication rules and the confusion over the significance of results — are related. The Model Penal Code’s general failure to distinguish conduct and adjudication rules made it less likely that state code drafters would notice what they would have seen as the Code’s inappropriate subjectivization of risk and risk offenses. If the Model Code had systematically segregated conduct and adjudication rules, it would have been more obvious to state code drafters that the Code’s formulation of risk-creation offenses was one that they could not accept. (shrink)

Paul H Hirst; Language and Thought, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 1, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 63–75, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1967.tb.

The authors use social science methodology to determine whether a doctrinal shift—from an objectivist view of criminality in the common law to a subjectivist view in modem criminal codes—is consistent with lay intuitions of the principles of justice. Commentators have suggested that lay perceptions of criminality have shifted in a way reflected in the doctrinal change, but the study results suggest a more nuanced conclusion: that the modern lay view agrees with the subjectivist view of modern codes in defining the (...) minimum requirements of criminality, but prefers the common law's objectivist view of grading the punishment deserved. The authors argue that there is practical value in having criminal law track shared community intuitions of the proper rules for assigning liability and punishment. For that reason, the study results support the often criticized subjectivist view of modern codes in setting the minimum requirements of liability, but disapprove of the modern codes' shift away from the common law's objectivist view of grading. (shrink)

It is easy to understand the apparent appeal of strict liability to policymakers and legal reformers seeking to reduce crime: if the criminal law can do away with its traditional culpability requirement, it can increase the likelihood of conviction and punishment of those who engage in prohibited conduct or bring about prohibited harm or evil. And such an increase in punishment rate can enhance the crime-control effectiveness of a system built upon general deterrence or incapacitation of the dangerous. Similar arguments (...) support the use of criminal liability for regulatory offenses. Greater punishment rates suggest greater compliance. But this analysis fails to appreciate the crime-control costs of strict liability. By explicitly providing for punishment in the absence of moral blameworthiness, the law undermines its moral credibility with the community and thereby provokes subversion and resistance instead of the cooperation and acquiescence it needs for effective crime control. More importantly, the system’s lost moral credibility undermines the law’s ability to harness the powerful forces of stigmatization, social influence, and internalized norms. Given the serious limitations inherent in the real-world application of general deterrence and preventive detention programs, the most effective crime-control strategy is to build the criminal law’s reputation for being just, which means avoiding the use of strict liability. (shrink)

Phylogenetic trees based on gene sequence data contain information about the evolutionary processes responsible for their genesis. Methods have now been developed which help to reveal those processes. The methods are based on simple models of evolutionary change but, when applied across individuals in a population, rather than across species in a higher‐level taxon, they can reveal the past history of population change. Examples from salamanders and viruses are used to illustrate how the past history of changes in speciation rate (...) and the origin of epidemics can be inferred in the absence of fossil material or historical documentation. (shrink)

Political discourse is saturated with metaphor, but evidence for the persuasive power of this language has been hard to come by. We addressed this issue by investigating whether voting intentions were affected by implicit mappings suggested by a metaphorically framed message, drawing on a real-world example of political rhetoric about the federal budget. In the first experiment, the federal budget was framed as similar to or different from a household budget, though the information participants received was identical in both conditions. (...) When the federal budget was described as similar to a household's, people considered the personal finances of a presidential candidate more relevant—a finding we replicated in a larger, pre-registered study. In a follow-up experiment, we presented participants with a more explicit rhetorical argument and found a similar effect, moderated by political affiliation. These studies illuminate how metaphorical comparison affects cognition for important real-world issues, sometimes in unintended ways. (shrink)